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Abstract—Uncertainty, error, and similar complications add
to the many challenges of cyber security. Various disciplines
have developed methods for managing these complications, but
applying these methods involves disambiguating overlapping
terminology and determining a method’s proper usage in the
context of cyber security, which has unique properties. This
process is here guided by the need for prediction, which is
required for cyber security to become more like traditional
sciences. A motivating malware analysis example is defined. A
five-element ontology of complications for prediction is presented,
and concepts from numerous disciplines are mapped to it in terms
of the motivating example.
I. MOTIVATION
Imagine we are asked to analyze a recently-isolated malware
sample. A typical approach is to perform a static analysis of
the binary involving disassembly and decompilation, or to run
a dynamic analysis in which the malware is executed in an
isolated environment [55]. Imagine we are then asked: “how
bad is it for us? How will the malware affect our organization?
What about organizations similar to ours? What about systems
in general around the world?” We are being asked to estimate,
to generalize, to predict.
What can we claim? How do we express and justify these
claims? What are the limits to the claims we can make?
Being able to answer these questions is one of the practi-
cal requirements for the developent of a science of cyber
security [23][36][56]. Hatleback [21, pp5-6] calls “lack of
predictive ability” one of the characteristics keeping cyber
security from becoming a true science, citing Schneider [53],
Maxion [34], and Kott [30]. But in previous work we have
described several unique features of cyber security and how
those features make cyber security different from traditional
sciences [47], which complicates the issue. Formalizing pre-
dictive mechanisms in cyber security remains an open research
task.
To understand the nature of prediction in computer se-
curity, this paper systematically examines the Complications
that arise when performing such a malware analysis and
the Consolations that various disciplines have developed to
manage these difficulties. This paper was developed in the
following way. First, a variety of scientific, engineering, and
operational disciplines were surveyed to identify the ways
that they express and manage error, uncertainty, and similar
complications to prediction. Second, these complications were
considered in terms of their manifestation in cyber security,
guided by the malware analysis scenario described above.
Finally, the complications were organized in the ontology
shown in Table I. The next section, which makes up the greater
part of this paper, discusses this ontology.
II. ONTOLOGY
Intuitively, there are a number of possible problems when
performing malware analysis. To begin with, our disassembler,
decompiler, or execution environment might have undocu-
mented bugs. So one aspect of uncertainty is related to the
Tool being used.
And even if our tools are bug-free, we might use them the
wrong way. We might use numbers and statistics to make
incorrect inferences, which would be a problem of Method.
Or we might mis-read or mis-type a number, or be subtly
biased in our interpretation of the results, in which case the
problem would be in the Analyst, namely ourselves.
Even without that, there might be a problem caused by the
Adversary, who might react in an unexpected way. Finally,
there might be unknowable issues in terms of the Context.
These are all aspects of the problem, and these aspects
interact with one another. For example, adversary-induced
uncertainty might exploit an analyst’s inherent cognitive bias,
thus leading to an invalid experiment design. Because we are
dealing with aspects of a situation, this paper does not refer
to our classification as a taxonomy, instead using the more
general term ontology [27][50, pp308,440].
Table I lists these types of difficulty along with interdis-
ciplinary examples, which we will now describe in more
detail. This paper is intended to function as a survey and as a
reference work so whenever possible, definitions are provided
from authoritative sources with page-numbered citations.
A. Tool
We’ve already considered that when we perform our mal-
ware analysis we might be doing so with buggy programs.
In general, no tool is guaranteed to be perfect. Engineers
and technicians who create tools to measure physical prop-
erties [44, pp29-31] developed measurement theory, which in-
cludes several fundamental concepts relevant to cyber security.
For example, imagine we are measuring a physical property
such as size or voltage. Whatever tool we use will have some
instrumental measurement error caused by “imperfections”
in the tool. So inaccuracy is “the imperfection of measure-
ments,” and uncertainty is this imperfection expressed numer-
ically “with a corresponding confidence probability” [44, p62].
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TABLE I
AN ONTOLOGY OF COMPLICATIONS FOR PREDICTION IN COMPUTER SECURITY
Aspect Interdisciplinary Examples:
Tool instrumental error as in measurement theory [44, p20], unreliability as in software reliability [41, p10]
and systems engineering [5, p362]
Method invalidity [54, p38] as in experiment design, incorrect specifications as in operations research [18, pp54-
55], unresolved foundational issues in statistics [60] [46]
Analyst personal error as in measurement theory [44, p20], errors as in human factors engineering [63, pp310-
315], biases as in intelligence analysis [24] [25], organizational error as in business management and
organizational psychology [17] [20]
Adversary unpredictability as in strategic theory [61, §2.2], induced uncertainty as in intelligence analysis [24, p.xx],
adversarial invalidation as in computer security [47]
Context • unknown at the moment epistemic uncertainty as in risk analysis [3, pp33-34], knowledge uncer-
tainty as in artificial intelligence [49, pp463-464]
• unknowable in practice aleatory uncertainty as in risk analysis [3, pp33-34], inherent uncertainty
as in intelligence analysis [24, p.xx], friction as in warfare [61, §1.7],
experimental uncertainty [10, p15] as in experiment design
• inherently unknowable unknowability as in operations management [43] [42, p1013] and as in
epistemology [45], deep uncertainty as in policy analysis [32, pp3-4]
The term error refers to the components of uncertainty, and is
usually used with additional adjectives so that we may speak
of the difference between “absolutely constant elementary
errors,” “conditionally constant errors,” and “random measure-
ment errors” [44, p63]. Measurement theory identifies and and
quantifies these errors using techniques such as calibration
measurements against a known value, statistical comparisons
of sets of measuring tools, or the use of “indirect data” [44,
pp20,57-60].
But beyond the hardware level, computer security uses tools
increasingly unlike the physical comparators and transducers
common to measurement theory. We must therefore look to
the study of software quality [62] which focuses on computer
programs more like those used in the malware analysis exam-
ple. One helpful concept is that of software failure, which is
“the occurrence of an incorrect output ... with respect to the
specification” [41, p2]. In contrast, software reliability is “the
probability that the system will perform its intended function
under specified design limits” and unreliability is the proba-
bility that the software will fail by a given time [41, p10]. An
example of software failure in our malware analysis example is
if our disassembler produces code that is inconsistent with the
language given the input binary; determining the likelihood
of this happening is quantifying the disassembler’s software
unreliability.
It may seem strange to think about the likelihood of software
failures – after all, if we find a bug in a program we should fix
it and be bug-free. But the challenge occurs with undetected
bugs: when testing suggests that our program is bug-free even
though the program bugs still has bugs. Even in these cases,
software reliability can use statistical methods to produce
estimates of the likelihood of undetected errors [35].
Security involves more than software, and security tools
are more than software tools. The discipline of systems
engineering, which studies complex systems of humans and
machines, defines unreliability in the same way as software
reliability [5, p362] and indeed appears to be the basis for
that definition. More generally, the complexity of systems
has led to taxonomies that distinguish between, for example,
reliability, dependability, and trustworthiness [57, p1247] and
ways of measuring these properties [37].
B. Method
Even if our software is bug-free, we still might make the
wrong types of conclusions after using it. How do we know
if our malware analysis generalizes to other systems? Do we
need to vary our testbed, and if so how many variations do we
need to use? If we end up with a big set of data, how do we
express this data and what types of inferences can we draw
from it?
In Section II-C we will discuss errors of reasoning on the
part of the analyst. Using an inappropriate method may be an
analyst error, but to understand the nature of the error we need
to understand the invalidities and uncertainties of the available
methods, which are the focus of this section.
We will be guided by the mechanistic perspective on ex-
perimentation in computing, which defines mechanisms as
organized entities and activities that produce regular changes
in a process [22, p443]. These mechanisms can be natural to
the physical world, such as the cognitive aspects of human-
computer interaction or engineered meaning artificial, such as
DNS schemes and DNS cache poisoning attacks [22, p444-
446]. We will consider methodologies for studying these
mechanisms, one at a time.
In our malware analysis example, the malware may depend
on a human victim clicking on a link sent to them by email, so
we may be interested in the natural mechanisms of the human
tendency to do so. So we might study the likelihood of people
clicking on an email link given various types of email text, or
after various types of security training.
Methods of studying natural mechanisms include random-
ized or non-randomized experiments, natural studies compar-
ing events and conditions, correlational observational studies,
and meta-analyses [54, pp12,426]. Invalidity is when we fail
to maintain “the truth of, correctness of, or degree of support
for an inference” in the context of a method, where truth
is defined in terms of its correspondence to the world, its
coherence with related claims, or its pragmatic value [54,
pp34-37,513]. There are numerous threats to validity.
After performing a study of humans clicking on potentially-
malicious links, if we ask “would a person at another or-
ganization also act this way?” we are questioning external
validity. More formally, external validity refers to “whether the
causal relationship holds over variations in persons, settings,
treatment variables, and measurement variables.” An inference
may be invalid if an effect that was found experimentally does
not hold when treatments, settings, or observations are varied,
for example [54, pp21,82-93,507].
In our example link-clicking experiment if we ask “is this
experiment actually capturing what we want?” we are ques-
tioning construct validity. More formally, construct validity
pertains to “making inferences from the sampling particulars
of a study to the higher-order constructs they represent.” An
inference may be invalid if participants react differently in
the experimental setting than they would in real life, or act
in ways they think the experimenter wants, or if the higher-
order constructs are not properly specified, for example [54,
pp20,64-82,506].
In our example link-clicking experiment if we ask “were the
experimental variations we introduced really the cause of how
people behaved?” we are questioning internal validity. More
formally, internal validity pertains to “whether the relationship
between two variables is causal.” An inference may be invalid
if an effect may be due to systematic participant selection or
attrition, or if an effect could have been caused by events not
being measured, for example [54, pp53-63,508].
In our example link-clicking experiment if we ask “are
the numbers really good enough to suggest a link between a
variation and how people behaved?” we are questioning statis-
tical conclusion validity. More formally, statistical conclusion
validity pertains to “ covariation between two variables.” An
inference may be invalid if a statistical test’s assumptions
have been violated, if a test has low statistical power in our
experiment, or if a test is repeated to “fish” for a statistical sig-
nificance without correction, for example [54, pp42-52,512].
Informally we may speak of a “valid experiment,” but more
formally validity relates to inferences rather than methods.
Validity depends on circumstances, so there is no methodology
that guarantees validity, and determining the validity of an
experiment involves “fallible human judgment” [54, pp34-
38]. Realistically speaking it is impossible to guard against
all potential invalidities simultaneously, so for any given ex-
periment, researchers need to make tradeoffs and be explicit in
describing mitigations in their experiment design, and readers
need to be aware of potential limitations of an experiment’s
inferences [54, 96-102].
In our malware analysis example, the malware being ana-
lyzed may also depend on a certain type of privilege escalation,
so we may be interested in the engineered mechanisms which
would allow the malware to perform such an escalation. In
this case we might study the malware in various testbeds using
various instrumentation, for example.
So in this case we are less interested in supporting or
falsifying general theoretical principles as with the physical
mechanisms above. Rather, we want to know more about
this particular engineered mechanism given this particular
engineered environment. This is much closer to the test and
evaluation (T&E) approach in operations research. A test “in-
volves the physical exercising (i.e., a trial use or examination)
of a component, system, concept, or approach for the sole
purpose of gathering data and information regarding the item
under test.” An evaluation “is the process of establishing the
value or worth of a component, system, concept, or approach”
and is generally dependent on the results of a test [18, pp3-4].
One of the first possible errors in conducting a T&E is
an incorrect specification of the problem [18, pp54-55]. The
use and operational environment that is planned for the system
under test must be fully understood, including systems that it
is expected to work with. If this is not done correctly, then
the T&E will provide useless or misleading results. More
generally, the first step of operations research is to perform
a system analysis defining the problem and identifying the
appropriate methods to be applied [52, pp301-310][58, pp8-
9]. Some of the key components of such a systems analy-
sis include developing descriptive and normative scenarios,
preparing objective trees, developing and ranking alternative
solutions, and iterating over this process while consulting with
stakeholders [52, pp29,57].
Statistical analyses are common to experimentation and
T&Es. Any approach that uses data will eventually use statis-
tical and probabilistic techniques, and there are a number of
ways of misusing these methods, as suggested above in terms
of statistical conclusion validity. But statistics additionally has
unresolved foundational issues.
In terms of our malware analysis example, imagine we
say there is an n% probability that the malware will affect
our organization’s central system. Are we saying that if the
malware attacked the central systems 100 times, it would
succeed n times? This corresponds to the frequentist perspec-
tive associated with classical statistics, which holds that a
probability is interpreted as “the frequency or propensity of
the occurrence of a state of affairs” [46, §2]. Alternately, are
we saying that if the malware attacked the system 1 time,
our degree of belief in its success is n%? This corresponds to
the epistemic perspective associated with Bayesian statistics,
which holds that a probability is interpreted as “the degree of
belief in the occurrence of the state of affairs” [46, §2]. But
there is more to it: for example, even frequentists may use
epistemic probabilities, and epistemic beliefs may relate to an
abstract rational agent’s beliefs, an abstract decision-theoretic
action, or a logical inference under uncertainty.
Related to the frequentist-epistemic distinction is the philo-
sophical problem of induction, which considers “the justifi-
cation of inferences or procedures that extrapolate from data
to predictions and general facts” [46] [60]. In our malware
analysis example, even if everything remains the same, we
cannot prove that just because we have seen an outcome once,
we will see that outcome again in the future. Perhaps we
should only characterize our conclusions as plausible and only
seek their falsification. But even this is problematic because
it requires perfectly-specified causal claims and theory-neutral
observations [54, pp15-16].
These are just a few of the disagreements over fundamental
questions in the theory of statistics and experimental method-
ology [54, pp24-29]. But clearly they have not crippled the
endeavors of science and engineering. Even philosophers of
statistics are less interested in the justification of indiction
and more interested in ensuring that statistical methods are
properly used [46, §1]. Practically speaking, inherent method-
ological limitations and foundational uncertainties remind us
that our methods give us possibly-useful results rather than
guarantees [54, pp30-31].
Every discipline develops an accepted set of methods, so it
is natural to conclude this section by asking about the accepted
methods of cyber security.
Cyber security researchers have discussed the importance
of experimental methodology [34] [48] [56] and the need for
foundations [19] [15] [36] but there has been little analysis of
these foundations [21], nor very much systematic application
of these foundations to research or to applied tasks [6] [23].
However, a discipline’s accepted methods change over
time [1, §4] so it is possible that the current situation will
eventually improve.
C. Analyst
Imagine we are performing our malware analysis, and there
are no problems with our tools, and our methodology does not
lead us astray. There is yet another danger: we ourselves might
make a mistake. We might click on the wrong button, or enter
the wrong number, or forget to run an important program.
In measurement theory these are called personal errors:
“individual errors that are characteristic of that person” [44,
p20]. Human factors engineering has a number of ways of
classifying these errors, but for our purposes we will be guided
by an information-processing perspective [63, pp310-315].
In our example malware analysis, if we are given a binary
to analyze, and if (unknown to us) it is ransomware, and if
after identifying the binary’s capabilities we determine that
it is a relatively harmless pop-up advertising program, we
are making a mistake. More formally, mistakes are errors
“of interpretation or of formulating intentions.” Among other
things, a mistake may be due to lack of knowledge, poor
communication, working memory overload, exceptions to a
common rule, or because of a cognitive bias as described
below [63, pp312-313].
In our example malware analysis, if we intend to type
“0x00BA” but instead we type “0x00AB” we are making a
slip. More formally, a slip is when “the understanding of the
situation is correct and the correct intention is formulated, but
the wrong action is accidentally triggered.” Another example
is clicking on the wrong button [63, pp313].
In our example malware analysis, if we forget to create a
system checkpoint before performing dynamic analysis, we
are committing a lapse. More formally, a lapse is a failure
to perform an action that we intended to. This is commonly
called “forgetfulness” with the caveat that human factors
engineers specify that a lapse is not due to working memory
overload [63, pp313-314].
In our example malware analysis, if we run our binary in the
wrong type of introspected environment, we are committing
a mode error. More formally, mode errors occur “when a
particular action that is highly appropriate in one mode of
(typically computer) operation is performed in a different,
inappropriate mode.” Typing a password into a ‘user id’ field
is a simple example [63, pp314].
Personal errors in a system may be identified by a human
reliability analysis and may be remedied by careful task
design, equipment design, and by training, among others [63,
pp315-320].
One approach to understanding and minimizing human error
is the intelligence community’s study of cognitive biases.
Biases are “mental errors caused by our simplified information
processing strategies,” but these are not cultural or political
prejudices: “a cognitive bias does not result from any emo-
tional or intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment,
but rather from subconscious mental procedures for processing
information” [24, p111].
Biases in evaluation of evidence include a tendency to
favor “vivid, concrete, and personal” over abstract information,
failures in appropriately dealing with missing information,
being overly focused on consistency when dealing with limited
information, managing possibly inaccurate information, and a
persistence in being affected by discredited information [24,
pp115-126].
Biases in perception of cause and effect result in favor-
ing causal explanations, as well as explanations that include
centralized direction, similar causes and effects, and overesti-
mating internal rather than external causes, for example [24,
pp127-146].
Biases in estimating probabilities include being overly in-
fluenced by available examples or an initial approximation,
or misinterpreting subjective or quantitative expressions of
probability [24, pp147-160].
Hindsight biases include overstating the accuracy of past
judgments, underestimating how much is learned by those
who read reports, and an after-the-fact tendency to believe
that events were more easily forseeable [24, p161].
These biases are the result of human cognition and as such
are not always easy to be rid of. However, they can be managed
by structured analytic techniques [26] such as the Analysis of
Competing Hypotheses [24, pp95-110].
So far we have only considered errors that are caused by
an individual analyst, but errors can also be caused by sets
of analysts in an organization. In the disciplines of business
management and psychology these organizational errors are
an active area of research, so there are many approaches
possible [17] [20]. We consider two examples that seem
particularly applicable to our domain.
Our first example comes from a defense analysis study
of organizational failure, specifically defined as relating to
an avoidable defeat: “failures attributable neither to gross
disproportion in odds nor egregious incompetence on part of
the victim nor yet to extraordinary skill on the part of the vic-
tor” [9, p.v]. From this perspective there are three basic failures
that can either exist on their own or combine together [9, pp25-
26]. A failure to learn is when an organization is aware of a
danger but does not appropriately observe and react to that
danger, leading to the organization suffering from the results
of that danger themselves. A failure to anticipate is when a
danger has not been observed but is easily predictable, and
yet the organization does not appropriately react. A failure to
adapt is when circumstances are rapidly changing but which
could have been minimized by reacting appropriately and
planning beforehand. These could be better understood and
avoided by analyzing historical case studies, exploring the
various tasks involved by command level, and determining the
types of failure that occurred and their effects.
Our second example1 comes from an information warfare
perspective: organizational malfunctions are when an attack
causes a decision-making operation to “operate in a way
that was unintended by the original designer of the orga-
nization and is probably undesireable for the organization.”
The following characterization is developed from technical
analogies, uses examples from the military, political, and
business decision-making, and focuses on “malfunctions that
arise specifically because of the large, distributed nature of
decision-making organizations and attendant systems.”
From this perspective, a Tardy Decision is made when
required information arrives too late to be used; a Low and
High Threshold relates to the amount of evidence required
1The categories and quotes in this example are from Kott [29, pp115-134]
for a decision: a low threshold of information required for
decisions can result in too many decisions being made; a high
threshold can result in not enough. An Excess of Timidity
or Aggressiveness occurs when a reaction is too weak or
too strong given the circumstances. A Self-Reinforcing Error
occurs when an action is made in the wrong direction, serving
to increase the situation’s problems. An Overload is when
a component of the system has met a limit and further
increase has no effect. A Cascading Collapse is when an
inappropriate decision in one part of the system propagates
to other parts of the system. A Misallocation of Authority is
when decision-making is decentralized in suboptimal ways. A
Lack of Synchronization and Coordination is when there is a
misalignment in decision-making. A Deadlock is when (for
example) a system component is waiting for a resource from
another component, which itself is waiting for a resource from
that first component. Finally, Thrashing and Livelock is when
a system is unable to reach a decision because it spends too
much time on action that is ultimately unproductive, possibly
because those actions look productive at the local level.
D. Adversary
The malware sample in our malware analysis example has
several ways of fighting back against us. The malware binary
might be encrypted or obfuscated, it may attempt to deceive
us as to what it is really doing, or it may change its behavior if
it believes it is being observed as it runs [55]. If the malware
authors come to believe that their malware has been detected,
they may change how the next iterations of their malware
works. Or they might change how their malware works just in
case anyone has detected them, without even being sure if that
is the case. So any predictions we make about the malware’s
behavior is contingent on its antagonistic nature.
In strategic theory this unpredictability is due to the fact
that an action “must expect positive reaction” and “the very
nature of interaction is bound to make it unpredictable” [61,
§2.2]. It’s worth looking more closely at this characterization,
which is from Clausewitz. Any action we make during a
conflict “must expect” a reaction – this is by definition,
because we are involved in a conflict with an intelligent reac-
tive adversary. That adversary may react through a “negative
action” to avoid or mitigate the results of our action, or a
“positive action” to advance their cause at our expense.
“The very nature of interaction” is that the adversary
also expects reactions from us, so are motivated to make
unpredictable actions. The best outcome for the adversary
would be to achieve surprise, in which we mis-estimate our
adversary but do not realize this until after we are attacked [12,
p18-note59]. To achieve this, the adversary may conduct
denial and deception operations to create a “fog” of induced
uncertainty [24, p.xx].
In strategic theory and intelligence analysis, deception
theory describes the ways that an adversarial organization
may attempt to induce uncertainty for their benefit. There
are many types of theories, but they tend to have certain
principles in common: a deception operation works in the
TABLE II
PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION AS DESCRIBED BY BENNETT AND WALZ AND APPLIED TO CYBER SECURITY [4, PP51-54,124]
revealing a fiction as with MITMs and honey-
pots
concealing a fiction e.g. OPSEC to withhold
operational capabilities
revealing facts as in releasing limited capabili-
ties to reduce attacker sensitivity
concealing facts as with cryptography and
stenography
context of the truth; this truth is denied to the target; deceit is
used; the target is misdirected [4, pp58-66]. These principles
can be mapped in a 2x2 matrix as shown in Table II. The
“concealing a fiction” and “revealing facts” quadrants may
seem counterintuitive, but are important in building credibility
during a deception operation. In fact, deception operations
should be carefully managed, with specific objectives defined,
information presentation and adversary behavior tracked [4,
pp49-57]. And to defend against adversary deception opera-
tions, there are a variety of technical and operational counter-
deception techniques [4, pp143-305].
These ideas are relevant to our malware analysis example
because security is fundamentally operational meaning it
depends on a specific context involving missions and adver-
saries; so the malware we are analyzing may be part of a
larger deception operation, and understanding this may be
important for a proper analysis [47]. Security’s adversarial and
operational characteristics affect the types of methods that we
may use. The experiments and tests described in Section II-B
are fundamentally different from methods that involve tactical
methods used against an adversary, but these methods against
an adversary are sometimes informally referred to as “exper-
iments” or “tests.”
An example of this is the historical “AF ruse” that occurred
during World War 2 just before the Battle of Midway [12,
pp57-59]. Naval intelligence had decrypted their adversary’s
messages referring to a target named AF, but there was some
doubt about whether AF referred to the Midway military
installation. To test this, naval intelligence sent a message to
Midway via undersea cable (which could not be intercepted)
ordering them to report back, via unencrypted transmission,
about a problem with their water supply. The unencrypted
transmission was duly sent, and several days afterwards an
adversary message was decrypted to reveal their belief that AF
had a problem with their water supply. This ruse confirmed
that AF was the code name for Midway.
Although the AF ruse involved technology and natural
phenomena, it was neither an experiment nor a test as defined
in Section II-B. Formally, the AF ruse was a tactical deception
operation to determine the state of an adversary’s knowledge.
The underlying motivation for the AF ruse was a disagreement
within naval intelligence about the identity of AF [12, pp57-
58]. The AF ruse was therefore also an operation to reduce
the type of analyst organizational uncertainty described in
Section II-C.
Of course, there was always the possibility that the AF ruse
had failed: that the adversary knew their messages were being
read and that the adversaries themselves were being decep-
tive, perhaps because they had been informed via espionage.
This would be an example of induced uncertainty through
deception. Similarly, the adversary may have developed an
undetected way to read the undersea cable; this type of
uncertainty, related to the development of technology, is what
we shall consider next.
From the perspective of military history we can consider
examples of technology’s effect on conflict. Analyses of
past events tend to focus on either the development of new
technology, or the effect on conflict once a new technology
is introduced; however, a “problem-solution-application” ap-
proach integrating both of these is more complete [28, pp39-
40]. When a belligerent has a problem related to their conflict,
they develop a (possibly technological) solution and apply it to
the conflict. But this creates a problem for their adversary, who
then seeks a solution (also possibly technological) and applies
it. Which creates a new problem for the original belligerent,
and so the adversarial cycle continues.
There is “chance and fortune” in this process [28, p50],
though organizational quality (as described in Section II-C)
plays a role. More relevant to the Adversarial aspect of
uncertainty is the following. Imagine a belligerent sees that
their adversary is using certain technology successfully against
them. The belligerent manages as best they can, while pursu-
ing technology to enable more effective counter-tactics. The
belligerent’s technology arrives, but in the meantime their
adversary has also been pursuing their own next generation
of technology. The extent to which the original belligerent’s
new technology has been made irrelevant by their adversary’s
new technology is adversarial invalidation: when a “method
has been undermined or counteracted by the antagonist and is
no longer as useful” [47]. Both the first belligerent and their
adversary will try to outguess each other both in developing
technology, as well as in the planning of tactics and opera-
tions2 that use this technology. This is one of the motivations
for the importance of understanding your adversary, which has
been emphasized since at least the time of Sun-tzu.
There are several technical approaches to representing and
reacting to adversary actions.
2Where tactics are the use of forces in direct contact (e.g. on a battlefield),
and operations are related sets of tactical actions [2, p13] [13].
Fig. 1. Characterizing Contextual Unknowns
Game theory allows systematic analyses of “interactive
decision making” [14, p5]. These interactions are represented
as abstract strategic games, generally between two participants,
where the games can be sequential vs simultaneous, in total
conflict vs some commonality, once or repeatedly, with the
same or with changing opponents, with full information or not,
and with equal information or not, and with fixed, manipulable,
or enforceable rules [14, pp18-27]. Analysis of these games
can provide explanations of events, prediction about what
types of outcomes are possible, and prescription of the types of
strategies likely to lead to desireable outcomes [14, pp36-37].
In artificial intelligence, competitive environments such
as two-player games can be analyzed through adversarial
search: given a starting situation, creating a search tree for
all possible moves. This search tree is often too large to
exhaustively search, so pruning and search heuristics are
usually applied [49, pp 161-185]. AI methods are often
combined together. For example, neural networks can be used
to evaluate moves, with their weights trained by evolutionary
methods or by reinforcement learning [33, p69]. A variety of
AI techniques have also been used to model the adversary:
identifying their objectives, their most likely future behaviors,
and their current plan [31, p77].
Operationally, the military uses analytic wargaming3 for
“the exploration of the role and potential effects of human
decisions” [40, p164]. Rather than attempting to make a pre-
diction or a generalization, a wargame should have a particular
objective, and it should generate data that allows the study of
how the players interacted and made decisions [40, pp270-
271]. Such wargames are also good for examining multiple
possible outcomes of conflicts [51, pp55-56].
E. Context
In our malware analysis example, even if our tools have
no errors, if our methods are not problematic, if we make no
personal errors and if our adversaries do not outwit us, there
still may be some unknowns in the environment. The malware
may exploit features in the host system that we were unaware
of, for example.
Our ontology will be guided by concepts from risk analysis
and operations management to distinguish between three types
3In contrast to training wargaming [40, p167].
of contextual unknowns as shown in Figure 1: those that are
knowable in theory but unknown at the moment, those that
are knowable in theory but unknowable in practice, and those
that are inherently unknowable.
1) Unknown at the Moment: When we begin the malware
analysis of our motivating example, the malware has a number
of properties that we have not yet discovered though we even-
tually will. The tests and experiments described in Section II-B
are conducted to reduce these unknowns.
In risk analysis,“those things about which we could learn if
we were able” produce epistemic uncertainty, also described
as “subjective, type B, reducible, state of knowledge” [3, pp33-
34].
Similarly, measurement theory refers to errors that “arise as
a result of an inadequate theory of the phenomena on which the
measurement is based and inaccuracy of the relations that are
employed” [44, p20]. This is referred to as “methodological
error” though it corresponds to the aspect of context in our
ontology, rather than methods as described in Section II-B.
Another similarly is in knowledge uncertainty in artificial
intelligence [49, pp463-464] which has several causes. First
theoretical ignorance because of “no complete theory of the
domain”. Second, practical ignorance because, for example,
“not all the necessary tests have been or can be run” (if
this does not preclude that this theory can be developed or
that these tests can be run. If the test cannot be run, it is
material for the next section.) Third, laziness because “it is too
much work” to acquire the relevant knowledge or “too hard
to use” that knowledge. The provocative term ‘laziness’ from
the source [49] is presumably not meant to indicate a moral
failing; when it refers to situations in which acquiring and
using knowledge may simply be computationally infeasible
due to run-times, then it is also material for the next section.
2) Unknowable in Practice: There may be other malware
properties that we could, in principle, discover but which
we are unable to, perhaps because we lack the computing
power or information about the malware authors. For example,
imagine we wanted to know the malware author’s immediate
surroundings, thinking that this would give us a clue to a
password that we need to know. In theory this is knowable,
but in practice it is usually not.
In risk analysis, things “about which we either cannot or
choose not to learn” produces aleatory uncertainty, also
described as “stochastic, type A, irreducible, variability” [3,
pp33-34].
In engineering, there is an uncertainty that is “variability
unrelated to the errors inherent in the measuring systems” and
includes, for example, variable flow rates in timewise exper-
iments, sample variability in sample-to-sample experiments,
and measurement variability in transient experiments [10,
pp15-17]. This is referred to as “experimental uncertainty”,
though it corresponds to the aspect of context in our ontology,
rather than methods as described in Section II-B.
It is similar to inherent uncertainty in intelligence analysis,
“the natural fog surrounding complex, indeterminate intelli-
gence issues” [24, p.xx]. It is also similar to friction as in
warfare; as Clausewitz says, “Countless minor incidents – the
kind you can never really foresee – combine to lower the
general level of performance, so that one always falls far short
of the intended goal.” [61, §1.7].
3) Inherently Unknowable: Finally there may be knowl-
edge that we are completely unaware of and which we could
not be expected to know about. To talk about such inherently
unknowable knowledge might seem to imply either “I know
the fact x but I know it incorrectly” or “I do not even know that
the fact x exists,” both of which are self-contradictions if x is
the content of the fact. However, a more tenable interpretation
is to think about x as part of a class of knowledge of which
we are unaware, without making claims about its content. [45,
p316]
This is called unknowability as in operations manage-
ment [42, p1013] [43]. When managing a project, there are
“known unknowns” which include the items that are currently
unknown or unknowable in practice, but in either case we
are aware that we lack knowledge about it. However, project
managers should also expect “unknown unknowns”: the ma-
terial that we do not know, and whose possibility we are
only dimly aware of. This is related to Black Swan events
as described in popular literature, which refers to unexpected
events that are outliers, that have an extreme impact, and that
are retrospectively predictable [59, p.xxii]
From the perspective of intelligence analysis, convergent
phenomena refers to “behavior of any system [that] could be
predicted from the average behavior of its component parts”
and divergent phenomena “are not governed by the laws of
cause and effect” or are otherwise unpredictable [8, pp186-
187]. This category relates to divergent material.
The discipline of policy analysis is familiar with the un-
knowability of the future, as it is their task to recommend
decisions that will have impacts lasting for decades. In this
situation of deep uncertainty, there is no clarity on the
models to use, the probability distributions of variables and
parameters, and the way of valuing potential outcomes [32,
pp3-4]. This is challenging because “the future is certain to
follow paths and offer events we did not imagine” [32, p8].
Unknowable does not necessarily mean beyond the realm
of human comprehension. If an operation suddenly encoun-
ters a previously unknown challenge, it is clearly no longer
unknown. At that point it likely becomes an unknown at the
moment or an unknown in practice, although in some cases the
effect may simply be considered contextual noise and handled
with one of the methods described below.
By definition the entire category of inherent unknowables
is ill-defined. The study of the exact nature of our ignorance
is sometimes called agnotology in the humanities [11]. In
epistemology, there is an acknowledgment that “the realm of
ignorance is every bit as vast, complex, and many-faceted as
that of knowledge itself.” [45, p316].
There are a number of technical methods for managing con-
textual unknowns. In artificial intelligence, Bayesian networks
uses linked random variables and conditional probabilities to
specify the uncertainties about the context [49, pp492-495].
These can then be combined with decision and utility nodes
to create decision networks [49, pp597-600] to represent the
influences on simple decisions. More complex sequences of
decisions are represented with a partially-observable Markov
decision process (POMDP), which tracks probabilistic beliefs
about the context through sequences of actions [49, pp613-
631].
Analytic approaches include scenario planning methods [7],
an example of which is long-term policy analysis (LPTA).
LPTA uses computer-assisted models to consider hundreds
to millions of possible future scenarios. These scenarios are
interactively explored by human analysts who seek strategies
that will enable robustness across the greatest range of possible
futures [32, p.xiii].
Operationally, organizations use open control loops repre-
senting tactical/operational-level decision-making, one of the
most well-known of which is Boyd’s OODA loops [38] [39].
This decision-making uses the following approach: Observe,
Orient, Decide, then Act, in this way remaining reactive to
any previously-unknown contextual situation or adversarial
action. In general, organizations seek to be flexible against
contextual unknowns while being resilient against adversarial
surprise and reliable against the types of errors described in
Section II-C [16].
III. CONCLUSION
This paper makes several contributions relevant to the
foundational problem of prediction in cyber security.
First, it approaches the problem from the angle of complica-
tions to prediction. This allows a systematic interdisciplinary
study of the types of complications involved, including error,
unreliability, unpredictability, and more. The same term can
be used differently in different disciplines, so definitions
are provided from authoritative sources, with page-numbered
citations for easy reference and further consideration.
Second, an ontology is developed to describe the various
aspects of the problem. This allows a better understanding of
the aspects of the challenge, in non-jargon language that is
nevertheless tied to the referenced disciplines. These aspects
are explained in terms of a malware analysis example scenario,
to describe their interdisciplinary methods to the cyber security
context.
Finally, along with the complications to prediction, we have
also described the methods that the various disciplines have
used to mitigate, express, or react to these complications.
These are described as “Consolations” and described in a very
general way, because the contextual and adversarial nature of
cyber security guarantee that these ways of managing compli-
cations cannot universally solve the challenges to prediction;
they can only improve the situation, and perhaps make it
winnable.
As a final thought on the malware analysis example: much
can go wrong when making a prediction. Perhaps our ultimate
consolation is that we are not just building structures in, or
developing knowledge about, an indifferent universe; we are
actually trying to outwit adversaries who are themselves also
making predictions. And these adversaries, though craftier
than an unthinking Nature, are as limited as we are, by the
very same complications.
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